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Abstract—This paper considers full-duplex (FD) device-to-
device (D2D) communications in a downlink MISO cellular
system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The D2D
pair communicate sharing the same frequency band allocated to
the cellular users (CUs). Since the D2D users share the same
frequency as the CUs, both the base station (BS) and D2D
transmissions interfere each other. In addition, due to limited
processing capability, D2D users are susceptible to external
attacks. Our aim is to design optimal beamforming and power
control mechanism to guarantee secure communication while
delivering the required quality-of-service (QoS) for the D2D link.
In order to improve security, artificial noise (AN) is transmitted
by the BS. We design robust beamforming for secure message
as well as the AN in the worst-case sense for minimizing total
transmit power with imperfect channel state information (CSI) of
all links available at the BS. The problem is strictly non-convex
with infinitely many constraints. By discovering the hidden
convexity of the problem, we derive a rank-one optimal solution
for the power minimization problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
While traditional half-duplex (HD) communication systems
operate in either frequency division duplexing or time division
duplexing mode due to lack of practical devices that can trans-
mit and receive concurrently using the same time-frequency
resources, recent results in full-duplex (FD) communications
have opened up new possibilities to double spectral efficiency
in next-generation wireless communications [1]–[4]. However,
the major detrimental element in FD communications is the
so called self-interference (SI) generated by the transmitting
node’s own signals. In the past, the most demotivating picture
of FD communications was the fact that the power of SI
can be tens of thousands times higher than that of the signal
of interest. Thus the SI is solely strong enough to kill the
receiver’s decodability.
However, with the advent of small-cell enabled hetero-
geneous networks (HetNets) as well as transmission in the
millimeter-wave (mmWave) frequencies, two key candidates
for fifth-generation (5G) networks, wireless transmission dis-
tance is showing a sharp decreasing tendency. Thus fu-
ture communication devices will transmit signals at ultra-
low power allowing significant reduction in SI power. This
makes concurrent transmission and reception by the same
node viable in the same frequency band. Thus FD radios
make communication possible that was previously deemed
impossible.
Recently, FD communication has attracted affluent interest
due to the development of sophisticated SI cancellation tech-
niques. In order to facilitate FD communications in practice,
several active and passive SI cancellation techniques have
been proposed in both analog and digital domains [5]. By
combining analog and digital cancellation techniques, antenna
cancellation approach proposed in [3] achieves the amount of
self-interference cancellation required for practical full-duplex
operation. The method offers up to 60 dB SI cancellation. In
[6], the authors have shown that the average amount of SI
cancellation increases for active cancellation techniques with
increasing received SI power. A major improvement in SI
cancellation has been demonstrated in [7] with up to 73 dB
cancellation in the digital domain for a 10 MHz OFDM signal.
However, the more advanced full-duplex technique proposed
in [8] uses a single antenna for simultaneous transmit-receive
operation allowing 110 dB SI cancellation.
Due to the ever increasing number of users and launching
of data-demanding services, the importance of efficient use of
wireless spectrum can not be overstated. Meanwhile, device-
to-device (D2D) communication has turned out to be a promis-
ing technology in this regard [9], [10], for offloading core-
network overhead in particular. In cellular systems, allowing
users within close vicinity with high signal to interference and
noise ratio (SINR) communicate directly with each other may
save significant resources. In such scenario, the D2D users do
not need to communicate through the base station (BS), the
BS only needs to send the necessary control signals to these
users. These users can either use unlicensed bands or share the
licensed spectrum. Thus D2D communications offer numerous
practically appealing benefits over traditional device-to-base
station (D2BS) paradigm including higher spectral efficiency,
shorter packet delays, and lower energy consumption. While
D2D communication paradigm offers enormous benefits, inter-
ference management from D2D transmission to cellular users
(CUs) and from cellular transmission to D2D links is crucial.
Optimal power control and proper resource allocation schemes
can guarantee that cellular systems have multi-dimensional
performance gain. Existing works have considered power con-
trol for D2D link to limit the interference and it’s detrimental
effects on overall system performance [9], [11]–[13].
While D2D communication is targeted for future small cells
deployments, distance between D2D users should be relatively
shorter thus allowing lower transmit power for the D2D
communication links. This opens up new prospects for D2D
FD communications. Considering the recent advancements in
FD radio design that can offer up to 110 dB SI cancelation [8],
along with the maximum transmit power of 20 dBm for D2D
communications, D2D is a well-suited candidate to harvest
maximum yield from FD radios.
Nonetheless, D2D communications are more vulnerable to
security attacks compared with the traditional D2BS counter-
part [1], [12]–[16]. The main reason is the limited compu-
tational capacity of the D2D nodes to implement traditional
cryptographic security measures. In this context, physical layer
security is a viable solution for secure D2D communications.
However, with limited processing capability and interference
temperature constraints to the main cellular users (CUs), D2D
systems need to be carefully designed to guarantee information
secrecy such that the legitimate users can correctly decode
the confidential information, while the eavesdroppers can
retrieve almost nothing from their observations [17]–[20]. A
jointly optimal resource sharing strategy for power control and
channel pairing of CUs and D2D links has been proposed
in [12] for single-antenna communications. The authors in
[13] designed security aware power control mechanism for
spectrum sharing networks. All these existing works on D2D
physical layer security considered HD communications.
In this paper, we consider a downlink MISO cellular system
in which a multi-antenna BS transmits a secure message to a
single-antenna CU in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers
and a pair of D2D communicating nodes. To enhance security,
the BS transmits artificial noise (AN) signal superimposed
with the secret message signal. The D2D pair communicate
using full-duplex radios sharing the frequency band allocated
to the CU. Since the D2D users share the same frequency as
the CU, both the BS and D2D transmissions interfere each
other. In particular, the licensed spectrum holder CU suffers
from interference due to the unlicensed D2D transmission.
Our aim is to design appropriate power control mechanism to
protect the CU’s secure communication while guaranteeing the
required quality-of-service (QoS) for the D2D link. To the best
of our knowledge, no existing work has addressed the problem
for FD D2D communications. We design robust beamforming
for secure message as well as the AN in the worst-case sense
with imperfect channel state information (CSI) of all links
available at the transmitter. Applying semidefinite relaxation
(SDR) techniques, we show that there always exists a rank-one
optimal solution for the power minimization problem. Simu-
lation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model of MISO downlink system in presence of
eavesdroppers and full-duplex D2D communicating nodes is
introduced. The joint transmit beamformer and AN design
algorithm is developed in Section III with imperfect CSI of all
nodes. Section IV shows the simulation results which justify
the significance of the proposed algorithms under various
scenarios. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a MISO cellular system
in which a multi-antenna BS equipped with 𝑁T antennas
transmits a secure message to a single-antenna CU in the
presence of 𝐾 non-colluding eavesdroppers each having a
single receiving antenna and a pair of D2D communicating
nodes. The D2D pair communicate using full-duplex radios
sharing the frequency band allocated to a CU carefully selected
by the BS. Since the D2D users share the same frequency
as the CU, BS transmission interferes the D2D users. At the
same time, the CU suffers from the interference due to D2D
transmission. To limit this interference, the CU may be chosen
for sharing frequency based on the interference-limited-area
method proposed in [11], [21]. The BS performs transmit
beamforming to send secret information to the CU creating
minimal interference to the D2D nodes.
For ease of exposition, we name the BS, the legitimate CU,
and the eavesdroppers Alice, Bob, and Eves, respectively, while
the D2D pair are named David and Dora for short. In order
to confuse Eves more effectively, it is assumed that Alice
transmits artificially generated noise signals superimposed
onto the message signal.
Let us now denote xs ∈ ℂ𝑁T×1, xn ∈ ℂ𝑁T×1 as the confi-
dential message signal vector and the AN vector, respectively,
and hb ∈ ℂ𝑁T×1, hd ∈ ℂ𝑁T×1, hr ∈ ℂ𝑁T×1, and he,𝑘 ∈
ℂ
𝑁T×1 as the conjugated complex channel vectors between
Alice and Bob, David, Dora, and the 𝑘th Eve, respectively.
The complex channel responses from David and Dora to Bob
and 𝑘th Eve are, respectively, given by 𝑔bd ∈ ℂ, 𝑔de,𝑘 ∈ ℂ
and 𝑔br ∈ ℂ, 𝑔re,𝑘 ∈ ℂ. In the aforementioned system model,
the received signals at Bob, David, Dora, and 𝑘th Eve are,
respectively, given by
𝑦b = h
𝐻
b (xs + xn) + 𝑔bd𝑥d + 𝑔br𝑥r + 𝑛b, (1)
𝑦d = h
𝐻
d (xs + xn) + 𝑔dd𝑥d + 𝑔dr𝑥r + 𝑛d, (2)
𝑦r = h
𝐻
r (xs + xn) + 𝑔dr𝑥d + 𝑔rr𝑥r + 𝑛r, (3)
𝑦e,𝑘 = h
𝐻
e,𝑘 (xs + xn) + 𝑔de,𝑘𝑥𝑑 + 𝑔re,𝑘𝑥r + 𝑛e,𝑘,
for 𝑘 = 1, . . . ,𝐾, (4)
where 𝑔dd ∈ ℂ and 𝑔rr ∈ ℂ are the self-interfering loop-
back channel responses between the transmit and receiving
circuitry at David and Dora, respectively, 𝑥d ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑝d),
𝑥r ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝑝r) are the transmit signals of David and Dora,
respectively, 𝑛b ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2b), 𝑛d ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2d), 𝑛r ∼
𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2r ), and 𝑛e,𝑘 ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2e,𝑘) are the additive Gaussian
noises at Bob, David, Dora, and 𝑘th Eve, respectively. We also
assume that the information and AN signals follow distribution
xs ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0,Qs) and xn ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0,Qn), respectively, where
Qs is the 𝑁T×𝑁T transmit covariance matrix and Qn is the
𝑁T ×𝑁T AN covariance matrix.
Based on the above signal model, the SINR at Bob, David,
Dora, and 𝑘th Eve are, respectively, given by
Γb =
h𝐻b Qshb
h𝐻b Qnhb + 𝑝d∣𝑔bd∣2 + 𝑝r∣𝑔br∣2 + 𝜎2b
, (5)
Γd =
𝑝r∣𝑔dr∣2
h𝐻d (Qs +Qn)hd + 𝜌d + 𝜎
2
d
, (6)
Γr =
𝑝d∣𝑔dr∣2
h𝐻r (Qs +Qn)hr + 𝜌r + 𝜎
2
r
, (7)
Γe,𝑘 =
h𝐻e,𝑘Qshe,𝑘
h𝐻e,𝑘Qnhe,𝑘 + 𝑝d∣𝑔de,𝑘∣2 + 𝑝r∣𝑔re,𝑘∣2 + 𝜎2e,𝑘
, ∀𝑘. (8)
Note that 𝜌d and 𝜌r in the SINR expressions for David and
Dora in (6) and (7), respectively, indicate the residual self-
interference, which can be written as 𝜌d ∼ 𝒞𝒩 (0, 𝜎2s,x), x ∈
{d, r} and 𝜎2s,x can be defined as 𝜎2s,x = 𝛼x𝑝x, where 𝛼x
depends on the amount of SI cancellation at node x.
In the following, we aim at developing secure precoding
schemes under power and interference control criteria in
order to ensure maximum network throughput in the D2D
communication framework.
III. ROBUST SECRECY BEAMFORMING
In recent studies, it has been demonstrated that the pres-
ence of D2D communication links increases overall system
throughput if appropriate resource allocation and power con-
trol mechanisms are applied [11], [21].
While most of the existing works on secure D2D commu-
nications assume perfect CSI, the assumption is not always
practical due to the time-varying nature of wireless communi-
cation channels. In many practical scenarios, it is often difficult
to obtain any information about the eavesdroppers’ CSI, or it
may even be impractical to assume that an eavesdropper is
present at all. Hence in this section, we develop a robust power
minimization algorithm considering the worst-case design. In
particular, we assume that the actual channels hb, hd, hr, and
he,𝑘 lie in the neighbourhood of the estimated channels hˆb,
hˆd, hˆr, and hˆe,𝑘, respectively, available at the BS. Hence, the
actual channels are modeled as
hb = hˆb + 𝜹b, hd = hˆd + 𝜹d (9)
hr = hˆr + 𝜹r, he,𝑘 = hˆe,𝑘 + 𝜹e,𝑘, ∀𝑘, (10)
in which 𝜹b, 𝜹d, 𝜹r, and 𝜹e,𝑘, ∀𝑘, represent the channel
uncertainties, which are assumed to be bounded such that
∥𝜹b∥2 = ∥hb − hˆb∥2 ≤ 𝜀b, for some 𝜀b ≥ 0, (11)
∥𝜹d∥2 = ∥hd − hˆd∥2 ≤ 𝜀d, for some 𝜀d ≥ 0, (12)
∥𝜹r∥2 = ∥hr − hˆr∥2 ≤ 𝜀r, for some 𝜀r ≥ 0, (13)
∥𝜹e,𝑘∥2 = ∥he,𝑘 − hˆe,𝑘∥2 ≤ 𝜀e,𝑘, for some 𝜀e,𝑘 ≥ 0. (14)
Similarly, the channel coefficients involving the D2D nodes
are defined as
𝑔bd = 𝑔bd + 𝛿bd with ∣𝛿bd∣ ≤ 𝜀bd, (15)
𝑔br = 𝑔br + 𝛿br with ∣𝛿br∣ ≤ 𝜀br, (16)
𝑔dr = 𝑔dr + 𝛿dr with ∣𝛿dr∣ ≤ 𝜀dr, (17)
𝑔de,𝑘 = 𝑔de,𝑘 + 𝛿de,𝑘 with ∣𝛿de,𝑘∣ ≤ 𝜀de,𝑘. (18)
As such, the robust power minimization problem under QoS
guarantee is formulated as
min
Qs,Qnર0
𝑝d,𝑝r≥0
tr (Qs +Qn) (19a)
s.t. min
∥𝜹b∥≤𝜀b
Γb ≥ 𝛾b (19b)
min
∥𝜹d∥≤𝜀d
Γd ≥ 𝛾d (19c)
min
∥𝜹r∥≤𝜀r
Γr ≥ 𝛾r (19d)
max
∥𝜹e,𝑘∥≤𝜀e,𝑘
Γe,𝑘 ≤ 𝛾e,𝑘, ∀𝑘, (19e)
0 ≤ 𝑝d, 𝑝r ≤ 𝑃max. (19f)
Note that the constraint (19b) guarantees interference control
to Bob from the D2D link and the constraint (19c)–(19d)
controls interference from the BS transmission to the D2D
link, while the constraint (19f) implements power control for
the D2D link with 𝑃max indicating the maximum allowable
transmit power for the D2D nodes. In constraints (19b)–
(19e), there are infinitely many inequalities due to the channel
uncertainties, which make the worst-case design particularly
challenging. It is guaranteed by (19b)–(19e) that the con-
straints are satisfied for all realizations of the channel error
terms related to the BS to users as well as D2D channels. As
such, statistical information about the channel error vectors
is not required in this approach, and the knowledge of the
upper-bound of the error norms is sufficient.
Remark: Note that when the optimal solution of problem
(19) satisfies the condition rank(Qs) ≤ 1, transmit beamform-
ing is the optimal strategy for Alice and the transmit power
required for the secret message transmission will be minimum.
The implementation complexity of corresponding solution is
significantly lower. We will prove the existence of a rank-
one solution later in this paper. However, we omit the rank
constraint for the moment for convenience.
For the worst-case based design in (19), the D2D channel
gains are upper-(or, lower-)bounded using triangle inequality
properties [22], [23]:
∣𝑥+ 𝑦∣2 ≤ (∣𝑥∣+ ∣𝑦∣)2 = ∣𝑥∣2 + ∣𝑦∣2 + 2∣𝑥∣.∣𝑦∣ (20a)
∣𝑥+ 𝑦∣2 ≥ (∣𝑥∣ − ∣𝑦∣)2 = ∣𝑥∣2 + ∣𝑦∣2 − 2∣𝑥∣.∣𝑦∣ (20b)
Applying (20), we have
𝑔bd ≜ max∣𝛿bd∣≤𝜀bd
∣𝑔bd∣2 = ∣𝑔bd + 𝛿bd∣2
≤∣𝑔bd∣2 + 𝜀2bd + 2𝜀bd∣𝑔bd∣ (21a)
𝑔br ≜ max∣𝛿br∣≤𝜀br
∣𝑔br∣2 = ∣𝑔br + 𝛿br∣2
≤∣𝑔br∣2 + 𝜀2br + 2𝜀br∣𝑔br∣ (21b)
𝑔dr ≜ min∣𝛿dr∣≤𝜀dr
∣𝑔dr∣2 = ∣𝑔dr + 𝛿dr∣2
≤∣𝑔dr∣2 + 𝜀2dr − 2𝜀dr∣𝑔dr∣ (21c)
𝑔de,𝑘 ≜ min∣𝛿de,𝑘∣≤𝜀de,𝑘
∣𝑔de,𝑘∣2 = ∣𝑔de,𝑘 + 𝛿de,𝑘∣2
≤∣𝑔de,𝑘∣2 + 𝜀2de,𝑘 − 2𝜀de,𝑘∣𝑔de,𝑘∣ (21d)
𝑔re,𝑘 ≜ min∣𝛿re,𝑘∣≤𝜀re,𝑘
∣𝑔re,𝑘∣2 = ∣𝑔re,𝑘 + 𝛿re,𝑘∣2
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Fig. 1. Total transmit power 𝑃T (dBw) versus Bob’s SINR threshold 𝛾b with
𝑁T = 10, 𝐾 = 4, 𝛾e = −5 (dB), and 𝛾D2D = −5 (dB).
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Fig. 2. Total transmit power 𝑃T (dBm) versus Eves’ SINR threshold 𝛾e with
𝑁T = 10, 𝐾 = 4, 𝛾b = 10 (dB), and 𝛾D2D = −5 (dB).
≤∣𝑔re,𝑘∣2 + 𝜀2re,𝑘 − 2𝜀re,𝑘∣𝑔re,𝑘∣. (21e)
To make (19) more tractable, we transform the infinitely
many inequality constraints (19b)–(19e) into finite linear ma-
trix inequalities (LMIs) by applying 𝒮-procedure [24]. For
completeness, the 𝒮-procedure is presented in Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1 (퓢-Procedure): Let 𝑓𝑖(x), 𝑖 = 1, 2, be defined as
𝑓𝑖(x) = x
𝐻A𝑖x+ 2ℜ
{
b𝐻𝑖 x
}
+ 𝑐𝑖
where A𝑖 ∈ 𝒞𝑛×𝑛,b𝑖 ∈ 𝒞𝑛, 𝑐𝑖 ∈ ℛ. The implication 𝑓1(x) ≤
0⇒ 𝑓2(x) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists 𝜇 ≥ 0 s.t.
𝜇
[
A1 b1
b𝐻1 𝑐1
]
−
[
A2 b2
b𝐻2 𝑐2
]
ર 0
provided that there exists a point xˆ such that 𝑓1(xˆ) < 0.
According to 𝒮-procedure, if there exists 𝜇b ≥ 0, 𝜇d ≥
0, 𝜇r ≥ 0, 𝜇e,𝑘 ≥ 0, ∀𝑘, we can transform the constraints
(19b)–(19d) into the finite set of LMIs in (22) (top of the
next page), where 𝑐e,𝑘 ≜ 𝛾e,𝑘
(
𝑝d𝑔de,𝑘 + 𝑝r𝑔re,𝑘 + 𝜎
2
e,𝑘
)
−
𝜇e,𝑘𝜀
2
𝑘. Substituting the above results into problem (19), we
can equivalently reformulate the problem as
min
Qs,Qnર0,𝑝d,𝑝r
𝜇b,𝜇d,𝜇r,{𝜇e,𝑘}
tr (Qs +Qn) (23a)
s.t. Γ¯b (Qs,Qn, 𝜇b) ર 0 (23b)
Γ¯d (Qs,Qn, 𝜇d) ર 0 (23c)
Γ¯r (Qs,Qn, 𝜇r) ર 0 (23d)
Γ¯e,𝑘 (Qs,Qn, 𝜇e,𝑘) ર 0, ∀𝑘, (23e)
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0 ≤ 𝑝d, 𝑝r ≤ 𝑃max. (23f)
Problem (23) is a standard SDP problem, which is convex, and
can be optimally solved via off-the-shelf interior-point based
solvers [25]. Apparently, the solution to the problem (23) may
not in general seem to be optimal to the original problem
(19) due to the rank relaxation considered earlier. However,
by discovering the hidden convexity in the problem (23), we
guarantee the optimality of the proposed solution as described
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the SDP problem (23) is feasible.
There always exists an optimal solution (Qs,Qn) to the
problem (23) such that rank(Qs) = 1.
Proof 1: See Appendix A.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of
the proposed robust transmission design through numerical
simulations. For the case of imperfect CSI, the error vectors
were uniformly and randomly generated in a sphere centred
at zero with the radius 𝜀b = 𝜀d = 𝜀r = 𝜀e,𝑘 = 𝜀 = 0.1. For
simplicity, we assume 𝛾e,𝑘 = 𝛾e, ∀𝑘, 𝛾d = 𝛾r = 𝛾D2D unless
explicitly mentioned. As a benchmark, we compare the results
with perfect CSI cases. All simulation results were averaged
over 1000 random channel realizations.
Fig. 1 studies the relation between transmit power and
Bob’s receive SINR threshold 𝛾b. As expected, the transmit
power is monotonically increasing with 𝛾b. In addition, if the
number of eavesdroppers 𝐾 increases, the total transmit power
will increase accordingly to tackle the increased number of
Eves. It is no surprise that the proposed robust design with
imperfect CSI requires higher power compared to the perfect
CSI counterpart since the robust algorithm requires to satisfy
infinitely many constraints.
In the next example, we show the effects of eavesdropping
constraints on BS transmit power. Fig. 2 shows the transmit
power versus Eves’ SINR requirement 𝛾e with 𝑁T = 10,
𝐾 = 4, 𝛾b = 10 (dB), and 𝛾D2D = −5 (dB) for both
perfect and imperfect CSI cases. The results in Fig. 2 show
the general trend that with relaxed eavesdropping constraint,
smaller transmit power is required. However, increasing 𝛾b
Γ¯b (Qs,Qn, 𝜇b) ≜
[
𝜇bI𝑁T +Qs − 𝛾bQn (Qs − 𝛾bQn) hˆb
hˆ𝐻b (Qs − 𝛾bQn) hˆ𝐻b (Qs − 𝛾bQn) hˆb − 𝛾b
(
𝑝d𝑔bd + 𝑝r𝑔br + 𝜎
2
b
)− 𝜇b𝜀2b
]
ર 0, (22a)
Γ¯d (Qs,Qn, 𝜇d) ≜
[
𝜇dI𝑁T − 𝛾d (Qs +Qn) −𝛾d (Qs +Qn) hˆd
−𝛾dhˆ𝐻d (Qs +Qn) −𝛾dhˆ𝐻d (Qs +Qn) hˆd + 𝑝r𝑔dr − 𝛾d
(
𝜌d + 𝜎
2
d
)− 𝜇d𝜀2d
]
ર 0, (22b)
Γ¯r (Qs,Qn, 𝜇r) ≜
[
𝜇rI𝑁T − 𝛾r (Qs +Qn) −𝛾r (Qs +Qn) hˆr
−𝛾rhˆ𝐻r (Qs +Qn) −𝛾rhˆ𝐻r (Qs +Qn) hˆr + 𝑝d𝑔dr − 𝛾r
(
𝜌r + 𝜎
2
r
)− 𝜇r𝜀2r
]
ર 0, (22c)
Γ¯e,𝑘 (Qs,Qn, 𝜇e,𝑘) ≜
[
𝜇e,𝑘I𝑁T + 𝛾e,𝑘Qn −Qs (𝛾e,𝑘Qn −Qs) hˆe,𝑘
hˆ𝐻e,𝑘 (𝛾e,𝑘Qn −Qs) hˆ𝐻e,𝑘 (𝛾e,𝑘Qn −Qs) hˆe,𝑘 + 𝑐e,𝑘
]
ર 0, (22d)
requires higher transmit power as we observed in Fig. 1 as
well.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the impact of David’s transmit power
𝑝d on the D2D link requirement for various residual SI with
𝑁T = 10, 𝐾 = 4, 𝛾b = 10 (dB), and 𝛾e = −5 (dB). It is
evident from Fig. 3 that increased residual SI requires higher
power to satisfy the D2D SINR requirement.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied optimal beamforming and power alloca-
tion strategies for secure communication with full-duplex D2D
link. We solved the worst-case robust beamforming problem
optimally through the discovery of the hidden convexity in the
problem. Exploiting FD transmission at all nodes (including
BS and Bob) could be an interesting future work.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Here we use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of
problem (23) to prove the existence of a rank-one optimal Qs.
Let us now define Ψs ર 0,Ψd ર 0,Ψr ર 0,Ψe,𝑘 ર 0, ∀𝑘, as
the dual variables associated with the constraints (23b)–(23e),
respectively, whereas Φs ર 0 and Φn ર 0 associated with Qs
and Qn, respectively. As such, the Lagrangian of (23) can be
expressed as
ℒ ≜ tr (Qs +Qn)− tr
(
ΨbΓ¯b (Qs,Qn, 𝜇b)
)
− tr (ΨdΓ¯d (Qs,Qn, 𝜇d))− tr (ΨrΓ¯r (Qs,Qn, 𝜇r))
−
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
tr
(
Ψe,𝑘Γ¯e,𝑘 (Qs,Qn, 𝜇e,𝑘)
)−ΦsQs −ΦnQn +Ω,
(24)
where Ω includes all the remaining terms not involving Qs.
For ease of exposition, let us now rewrite Γ¯b, Γ¯d, Γ¯r, and
Γ¯e,𝑘 as
Γ¯b = Λb (𝜇b) + H¯
𝐻
b (Qs − 𝛾bQn) H¯b, (25a)
Γ¯d = Λd (𝜇d)− 𝛾dH¯𝐻d (Qs +Qn) H¯d, (25b)
Γ¯r = Λr (𝜇r)− 𝛾rH¯𝐻r (Qs +Qn) H¯r, (25c)
Γ¯e,𝑘 = Λe,𝑘 (𝜇e,𝑘) + H¯
𝐻
e,𝑘 (𝛾e,𝑘Qn −Qs) H¯e,𝑘, (25d)
where
Λb (𝜇b) ≜
[
𝜇bI𝑁T 0
0 −𝛾b
(
𝑝d𝑔bd + 𝑝r𝑔br + 𝜎
2
b
)− 𝜇b𝜀2b
]
,
H¯b ≜
[
I𝑁T hˆb
]
, H¯e,𝑘 ≜
[
I𝑁T hˆe,𝑘
]
,
Λd (𝜇d) ≜
[
𝜇dI𝑁T 0
0 𝑝r𝑔dr − 𝛾d
(
𝜌d + 𝜎
2
d
)− 𝜇d𝜀2d
]
,
H¯d ≜
[
I𝑁T hˆd
]
, H¯r ≜
[
I𝑁T hˆr
]
,
Λr (𝜇r) ≜
[
𝜇rI𝑁T 0
0 𝑝d𝑔dr − 𝛾r
(
𝜌r + 𝜎
2
r
)− 𝜇r𝜀2r
]
,
Λe,𝑘 (𝜇e,𝑘) ≜
[
𝜇e,𝑘I𝑁T 0
0 𝑐e,𝑘
]
.
The relevant KKT conditions can be defined as
∇Qsℒ = 0, (26a)
Γ¯b (Qs,Qn, 𝜇b)Ψb = 0, (26b)
Γ¯d (Qs,Qn, 𝜇d)Ψd = 0, (26c)
Γ¯r (Qs,Qn, 𝜇r)Ψr = 0, (26d)
ΦsQs = 0, (26e)
Ψs ર 0,Ψd ર 0,Ψr ર 0,Ψe,𝑘 ર 0, ∀𝑘. (26f)
Using (25), the KKT condition (26a) can be expressed as
I𝑁T−H¯bΨbH¯𝐻b +𝛾dH¯dH¯𝐻d +𝛾rH¯rH¯𝐻r +
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
H¯e,𝑘Ψe,𝑘H¯
𝐻
e,𝑘
= Ψs. (27)
Let Σ denote the positive-definite matrix
Σ≜I𝑁T+𝛾dH¯dH¯𝐻d +𝛾rH¯rH¯𝐻r +
𝐾∑
𝑘=1
H¯e,𝑘Ψe,𝑘H¯
𝐻
e,𝑘. (28)
Multiplying both sides of (27) byQs and using KKT condition
(26e), we have
ΣQs = H¯bΨbH¯
𝐻
b Qs (29)
Thus it is obvious that
rank (Qs) = rank (ΣQs) ≤ rank
(
H¯bΨbH¯
𝐻
b Qs
) (30)
since pre(post)-multiplying any matrix by a positive-definite
matrix does not change its rank. Next, we show that
rank(H¯bΨbH¯
𝐻
b ) ≤ 1. Substituting (25a) into the KKT
condition (26b), we obtain
Λb (𝜇b)Ψb + H¯
𝐻
b (Qs − 𝛾Qn) H¯bΨb = 0. (31)
Post-multiplying (31) by H¯𝐻b yields
Λb (𝜇b)ΨbH¯
𝐻
b + H¯
𝐻
b (Qs − 𝛾Qn) H¯bΨbH¯𝐻b = 0. (32)
Now, the following facts can be easily verified:
[I𝑁T 0] H¯
𝐻
b = I𝑁T
[I𝑁T 0]Λb (𝜇b) = 𝜇b [I𝑁T 0] = 𝜇b
(
H¯b −
[
0𝑁T hˆb
])
.
Premultiplying both sides of (32) by [I𝑁T 0] we get
(𝜇bI𝑁T +Qs − 𝛾bQn) H¯bΨbH¯𝐻b = 𝜇b
[
0𝑁T hˆb
]
ΨbH¯
𝐻
b .
(33)
Lemma 2: If a hermitian matrix M =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
ર
0, then it immediately follows that M11 and M22 must be
PSD matrices [22].
Applying Lemma 2 to (22a), we have that 𝜇bI𝑁T +Qs −
𝛾bQn ર 0. Then the following rank relation holds
rank
(
H¯bΨbH¯
𝐻
b
)
=rank
(
(𝜇bI𝑁T +Qs − 𝛾bQn)H¯bΨbH¯𝐻b
)
= rank
(
𝜇b
[
0𝑁T hˆb
]
ΨbH¯
𝐻
b
)
≤ rank
([
0𝑁T hˆb
])
≤ 1 (34)
where (34) follows from a basic rank inequality property
[22]. Note that Qs = 0 does not satisfy the constraint (19b)
hence can not be the optimal solution to problem (23). Thus
combining (30) and (34), we conclude that rank (Qs) = 1
must hold. □
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